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Abstract
Kripke’s theory of truth is arguably the most influential approach to self-referential
truth and the semantic paradoxes. The use of a partial evaluation scheme is crucial to
the theory and the most prominent schemes that are adopted are the strong Kleene and
the supervaluation scheme. The strong Kleene scheme is attractive because it ensures the
compositionality of the notion of truth. But under the strong Kleene scheme, classical
tautologies do not, in general, turn out to be true and, as a consequence, classical reasoning
is no longer admissible once the notion of truth is involved. The supervaluation scheme
adheres to classical reasoning but violates compositionality. Moreover, it turns Kripke’s
theory into a rather complicated affair: to check whether a sentence is true we have
to look at all admissible precisification of the interpretation of the truth predicate we
are presented with. One consequence of this complicated evaluation condition is that
under the supervaluation scheme a more proof-theoretic characterization of Kripke’s
theory becomes inherently difficult, if not impossible. In this paper we explore the
middle ground between the strong Kleene and the supervaluation scheme and provide
an evaluation scheme that adheres to classical reasoning but retains many of the attractive
features of the strong Kleene scheme. We supplement our semantic investigation with a
novel axiomatic theory of truth that matches the semantic theory we have put forth.
1. Introduction
In his seminal Outline of a Theory of Truth, Kripke (1975) proposed a semantic account of
truth, which remains one of the most prominent approaches to self-referential truth and the
semantic paradoxes. Kripke’s idea was to work with models for an arithmetical language
with the truth predicate, LT, in which the truth predicate was only partially defined.1 The
starting point would be a model of the base language together with a (possibly empty)
set of sentences that have already been declared true. Then using an appropriate partial
evaluation scheme we collect sentences that are true under this initial interpretation of the
1The choice of an arithmetical base language and theory is not essential to the proposal. We could work in
an alternative framework and language as long as a sufficiently rich theory of syntax is available. Throughout
the paper we assume LT to be a standard first-order arithmetical language that contains an additional unary
predicate—the truth predicate. LT may also, in addition to S, + and ×, contain further function symbols for
certain primitive recursive functions.
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truth predicate. These sentences then make up the new interpretation of the truth predicate. If
we have chosen our initial interpretation of the truth predicate wisely the initial interpretation
will be a subset of the new interpretation of the truth predicate. We may then continue this
procedure until we eventually reach a point in the process in which no new sentences enter
the interpretation of the truth predicate. Such an interpretation of the truth predicate is
called a fixed point and contains all the sentences that are true under the very interpretation
itself, given the chosen evaluation scheme. These fixed points display some very attractive,
truth-like features and are thought to be suitable (candidate) interpretations of the truth
predicate. However, depending on which partial evaluation scheme is assumed, these fixed
points—and ultimately the resulting notion of truth—will have very different characteristics.
Among the suitable partial evaluation schemes, two schemes stand out: the strong Kleene
scheme and the supervaluation scheme.2,3
The strong Kleene scheme provides us with truth tables for three truth values and thereby
allows us to compute the truth value of a complex sentence by examining the truth value of all
its subsentences: once we know the the truth values of all the subsentences of a sentence we
know the truth value of the sentence itself. In this sense the scheme is fully compositional.4
The compositionality of the strong Kleene scheme gives the process by which we arrive at
suitable interpretations of the truth predicate a constructive and transparent flavor since,
in general, we move from simple sentences in the interpretation of the truth predicate to
more complex ones. Moreover, due to the compositionality of the strong Kleene scheme
the construction process will also lead to a compositional notion of truth, that is, whether a
sentence is true in the object-linguistic sense, only depends on whether its subsentences are
true or false (or neither) in the object-linguistic sense.5 Since compositionality is thought to be
a key feature of the notion of truth this outcome is highly desirable. More generally, we take
it that the evaluation of a sentence should be as transparent as possible and should proceed,
as far as possible, via the compositional structure, that is the built-up, of a sentence. Within
the context of Kripke’s theory of truth the strong Kleene scheme is the strongest available
partial scheme that fully subscribes to this maxim.
However, the strong Kleene scheme has one major drawback. Logical truths or, more
generally, penumbral truths, that is, sentences that are true because of the logical relations that
hold among the sentences of the language, will not alway be true under the strong Kleene
2As a matter of fact there is not one particular supervaluation scheme but rather a family of different such
schemes. For the sake of this introduction we ignore this complication and treat them as one. For the most
important supervaluation schemes for theories of truth see our Section 3.1, McGee (1991),Burgess (1986) or Field
(2008).
3Further partial evaluation schemes have been discussed as well but never really caught on to the same
extent. See, e.g., Martin and Woodruff (1975), Fujimoto (2010) and Field (2008).
4Compositionality is sometimes taken to imply that truth, or the satisfaction relation, commutes with all
logical connectives. However, since the strong Kleene scheme assumes three truth values but is formulated in a
classical metatheory this will not generally hold for this scheme. While the scheme commutes with conjunction,
disjunction and the quantifiers it does not commute with negation: if a sentence is not true in the metalinguistic
sense according to the strong Kleene scheme this does not imply that its negation is true in the metalinguistic
sense according to the strong Kleene scheme. The sentence may be neither true nor false. From this point of
view the strong Kleene scheme is perhaps not fully compositional. But this notion of compositionality, which
ties the idea of compositionality to the commutation of truth with the logical connectives, is at best a derived
notion, which seems to be acceptable for classical logic but deeply misguided when applied to partial evaluation
schemes.
5Throughout this paper we say that a sentence is false iff its negation is true.
2
scheme.6 This is problematic because there seems to be a strong intuition that a disjunction
such as “all of Nixons assertions about Watergate are false or it is not the case that all of Nixons
assertions about Watergate are false” is true, but in the strong Kleene scheme if neither disjunct
receives a classical truth value, this disjunction will not be true, instead it will lack a classical
truth value. In contrast, penumbral truths will always be true under the supervaluation
scheme and this feature was one of the motivations for introducing the scheme.7 The
supervaluation scheme is not based on truth tables for three truth values. Rather, it considers
classical extensions of a partial model, so-called precisifications. Precisifications are models
in which more semantic information is provided than in the partial model we have started
out from. In the case of truth this means that we consider classical models in which the
interpretation of the truth predicate extends the interpretation of the truth predicate in the
partial model. Since we are only considering classical precisifications we are guaranteed
that all logical truths will be true under the supervaluation scheme. More generally, all
sentences that are a classical consequence of sentences that are true in all the precisifications
that are considered will also be true under the evaluation scheme, independently of whether
their subsentences always receive the same classical truth value. Moreover, despite the
abstract sounding truth conditions, there is an intuitive rationale to the supervaluation
scheme: a sentence is true according to the supervaluation scheme iff it is true according
to all (classical) ways of making our current understanding of the truth predicate more
precise. However, this way of evaluating sentences is also rather complicated and highly
intransparent: instead of computing the truth value of a sentence by appeal to the truth value
of its subsentences the scheme looks at all candidate interpretations of the truth predicate
to determine whether a sentence is true. It is thus not surprising that the process by which
we arrive at suitable interpretations of the truth predicate is highly intransparent under
the supervaluation scheme and also less constructive than in the case of the strong Kleene
scheme. Moreover, since the evaluation of a sentence does not proceed via its compositional
structure, the notion of truth Kripke’s theory of truth based on the supervaluation scheme
gives rise to is non-compositional.
The complicated nature of the supervaluation scheme also makes it very difficult to pro-
vide proof-theoretic characterizations of Kripke’s theory of truth based on the supervaluation
scheme. For the strong Kleene case there are interesting proof-theoretic characterizations
both in classical but also in strong Kleene logic: for classical logic we have the theory KF
(Kripke-Feferman) whereas for strong Kleene logic this would be the theory PKF (Partial
Kripke-Feferman).8 While it is impossible to axiomatize a given fixed point directly, it is
possible to characterize the lattice of fixed points relative to the natural number structure:
the interpretations of the truth predicate of KF (PKF) are exactly the fixed points of Kripke’s
theory of truth based on the natural number structure. This criterion is calledN-categoricity
in Fischer et al. (2015) where it is also shown that there can be no N-categorical axiomatiza-
tion of Kripke’s theory of truth based on the supervaluation scheme in classical logic. Nor is
it possible to provide a proof-theoretic characterization of Kripke’s supervaluational theory
of truth in some “supervaluational logic”, at least if understood in a straightforward way:
as Kremer and Kremer (2003) and Kremer and Urquhart (2008) show there is no such thing
6The term penumbral connections was introduced by Fine (1975) in connection to vagueness.
7See van Fraassen (1968); Van Frassen (1969) and Fine (1975) for discussion in connection to non-denoting
singular terms and vagueness. See McGee (1991) for an explicit appeal to this type of motivation in the case of
truth.
8See Halbach (2011) for an exposition of both theories.
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as a “supervaluational logic” matching the supervaluation scheme at play. This absence
of interesting proof-theoretic characterizations supports our claim that the supervaluation
scheme is intransparent and to a certain extent even mysterious: it cannot be illuminated by
a proof theory that goes alongside.9
So we find ourselves in some sort of dilemma: on the one hand we have Kripke’s theory
of truth based on the strong Kleene scheme, which is based on a simple and transparent
evaluation scheme, gives rise to a compositional notion of truth and allows for proof-theoretic
characterizations but fails to declare logical truths to be true. On the other hand, we have
Kripke’s theory based on the supervaluation scheme, which declares all penumbral truths
and, in particular, all logical truths to be true. But this version of the theory is based on a
rather complicated scheme, assumes a non-compositional notion of truth and does not allow
for a proof-theoretic characterization. So both versions of Kripke’s theory of truth have some
very desirable features and thus the immediate question arises whether we can compromise
between the two. Unfortunately, there is a limit to what we can do since there is a genuine
tension between compositionality and the intuition that penumbral truths should be true
under the evaluation scheme at stake. If we admit the latter, then a disjunction in which
both disjuncts do not have a classical truth value can either be true or indeterminate.10 As a
consequence no scheme that allows for classical logical truths can compute the truth value of
a sentence by appeal to the truth value of its subsentences and therefore the scheme cannot
be compositional. While we cannot have both compositionality and penumbral truths, it is
possible, as we shall see, to narrow the gap between compositional schemes and schemes
that allow for penumbral truths. In particular, it is possible to provide evaluation schemes
that allow for penumbral truths while being much simpler and more transparent than the
supervaluation scheme. Such an alternative evaluation scheme will work like the strong
Kleene scheme in most cases, that is, it will usually evaluate sentences by appeal to its
subsentences—except for cases of penumbral truths. For the cases of penumbral truths, the
scheme should exploit the logical relations that hold among the relevant sentences, as it is
done in the supervaluation scheme. However the idea would be that this can be done in
a much simpler and transparent way, so to minimize the gap between the compositional
strong Kleene scheme and this scheme. As a consequence of the newly gained simplicity
the scheme should lend itself to a version of Kripke’s theory of truth that allows for a neat
proof-theoretic characterization. The aim of this paper will be to provide such an alternative
evaluation scheme together with a list of principles of truth, which jointly axiomatize Kripke’s
theory of truth based on this novel scheme.
1.1 Structure of the Paper
In the next section we take a fresh look at the supervaluation scheme and investigate how
it is precisely that the scheme accounts for penumbral truths or, more generally, penumbral
connections between sentences. As we shall see, the supervaluation scheme accounts for
the penumbral connections between sentences by some form of second-order consequence
9The theory VF developed by Cantini (1990) is intended to capture aspects of Kripke’s supervaluational
theory of truth. However, the theory cannot distinguish supervaluational truth from revision theoretic truth and
in this sense falls short from providing a proof-theoretic account of Kripke’s supervaluational theory of truth.
10See, e.g., Fine (1975) for remarks along these lines. Note that a sentence is indeterminate iff it does not
receive a classical truth value. For a true disjunction with indeterminate disjuncts the Nixon-example above
does the trick. For the indeterminate case replace one disjunct of the Nixon-example by, e.g., the sentence “this
sentence is not true”.
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relation. We argue that this is too strong and that we should instead account for penumbral
connections between sentences using the first-order consequence relation. This will lead to
a simpler and more transparent scheme in which penumbral truths come out true as it was
intended. In the section thereafter we provide a more rigorous discussion of the different
evaluation schemes at play, that is, the supervaluation schemes, the strong Kleene scheme
and the novel supervaluation-style truth schemes. Section 4 shows that the supervaluation
scheme and the supervaluation-style truth scheme lead to the same notion of grounded
truth, that is, both schemes have the same minimal fixed point. The result is established
by appeal to a characterization of the minimal supervaluation fixed point via an infinitary
sequent calculus introduced by Cantini (1990). In the remainder of the paper we turn
to more proof-theoretic aspects. In Section 5 we introduce the truth theory of Inductive
Truth (IT), which is intended to capture salient aspects of Kripke’s theory of truth based
on the supervaluation-style truth scheme. To substantiate this claim we show IT to be
an N-categorical axiomatization of the aforementioned version of Kripke’s theory of truth,
i.e., the fixed points of the novel supervaluation-style truth scheme are exactly the suitable
interpretations of the truth predicate of IT relative to the standard model. Section 6 ends our
proof-theoretic investigations by establishing, again using a result by Cantini (1990), that IT
is proof-theoretically equivalent to ID1. The paper closes with a short summary of our results
and their relevance.
2. Consequence, Supervaluation and Penumbral Truths
In the introduction we motivated the supervaluation scheme chiefly by its ability to account
for the truth of sentences that are true simply because of the logical relations that hold
between their subsentences, or their logical relation to the sentences in the interpretation
of the truth predicate. For example, the tertium non datur will always be true since it is a
disjunction of a sentence and its negation. Similarly, if we allow for vague predicates, ‘it is
not the case that this coffee mug is blue and green’ is true because the two color predicates
are, by definition, mutually exclusive. The truth value of the complex sentence is hence
independent of the truth value of its subsentences since the two color ascriptions of the
sentence might not receive a classical truth value. So whereas the strong Kleene scheme only
uses the compositional structure of sentences, that is their build-up, for their evaluation, the
supervaluation scheme also uses the logical relations that hold among different sentences,
that is, the supervaluation scheme also uses what one might call the logical structure a sentence
is embedded in. This raises the obvious question of what we take this logical structure to be
and how we should explicate the notion of logical relation. However, before we enter this
discussion we should provide a precise definition of the supervaluation scheme (sv) in the
context of Kripke’s theory of truth:
(N,S) |=sv φ :⇔ ∀S′
(
S ⊆ S′& Φ(S′)⇒ (N,S′) |= φ
)
(N,S) is a model for the language LT, where N is the natural number structure and thus
interprets the arithmetical fragment of the language, while S is a set of (codes of) sentences
that serves as the interpretation of the truth predicate. In partial evaluation schemes such
as the supervaluation scheme it is common to provide not only an extension but also an
antiextension for interpreting the truth predicate. The extension tells us which sentences
are true whereas the antiextension tells us which sentences are false. However, we can omit
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explicit mention of the antiextension by taking it to consist of the negations of the sentences
in the truth predicate’s extension and we shall adopt this approach throughout this paper
independently of the partial evaluation scheme under consideration.11 In this version of the
supervaluation scheme we do not evaluate sentences with respect to every precisification but
only those that are admissible, i.e., which meet some admissibility condition Φ(S). For example,
one basic admissibility condition requires a precisification not to contradict the sentences
in the truth predicate’s extension. As a matter of fact we shall only consider admissibility
conditions that enforce the minimal requirement of the basic admissibility conditon, which
we shall discuss in more detail when we discuss the supervaluation scheme vb in Section 3.1.
The above definition of the supervaluation scheme makes it difficult to understand our
previous remarks that the supervaluation scheme uses the compositional and the logical
structure in evaluating sentences. Let us consider a simple disjunction Tpφq ∨ ¬Tpψq to
illustrate these two components of the supervaluation scheme.12 According to the superval-
uation scheme there are two possible scenarios under which this disjunction is true in a given
interpretation S: either (i) S |=sv Tpφq or S |=sv ¬Tpψq, or (ii) S 6|=sv Tpφq and S 6|=sv ¬Tpφq
but S |=sv Tpφq ∨ ¬Tpψq. Assuming some reasonable admissibility condition (i) will hold
iff either #φ ∈ S or #¬ψ ∈ S. In case (ii), the interpretation S together with the admissibility
condition Φ has to imply that in all admissible precisifications S′: #ψ ∈ S′ implies #φ ∈ S′.
Now in case (i) the evaluation of the disjunction proceeds via the compositional structure of
the sentence. Indeed case (i) provides exactly the standard truth conditions of Tpφq∨¬Tpψq
under the strong Kleene scheme. In contrast, in case (ii) the compositional structure of the
sentence plays at best an indirect role in the evaluation of the sentence. Whether the disjunc-
tion will be true depends on which precisifications we consider and, ultimately, what logical
relation the disjunction bears to the members of S. From this perspective the supervaluation
scheme seems to be somewhat disjunctive in character: on the one hand the scheme checks
whether a given sentence is true because of is compositional structure. On the other hand,
it checks whether the sentence is true due to the logical relations it bears to the members
of S. These admittedly rather vague observations and remarks generalize and can be made
fully precise by providing an alternative, equivalent definition of the supervaluation scheme,
which we will explain informally after explaining some terminology:13
S |=sv φ :⇔ ∃G
(
∀ψ ∈ G(S |=sk ψ) &∀S′
(
S ⊆ S′& Φ(S′)⇒ (∀ψ ∈ G(S′ |= ψ)⇒ S′ |= φ)
))
11More precisely, the antiextension of the truth predicate S− is defined relative to the extension S in the
following way:
S− := {#ψ : ∃φ(φ  ¬ψ& #φ ∈ S} ∪ {#¬ψ : #ψ ∈ S &¬∃φ(ψ  ¬φ)}.
By #φ we denote the Go¨del number of a sentence φ. In the context of Kripke’s theory of truth there is no loss of
generality by taking the antiextension to be defined because for all customary evaluation schemes the Kripkean
process of constructing the interpretation of the truth predicate guarantees the extension and the antiextension
to be interdefinable in the above way.
12pφq is a name of the sentence φ. Throughout this paper we take pφq to be the numeral of the Go¨del number
of φ. The Go¨del number of φ will be denoted, as mentioned, by #φ.
13The two definiens are equivalent for consistent sets S only but the supervaluation scheme is usually only
defined for consistent sets. So there is no loss of generality. The argument works by showing that for all S′ such
that S ⊆ S′ and S− ∩ S′ = ∅ and all sentences φ of LT:
S |=sk φ⇒ S′ |= φ.
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Since we only work in the standard model of arithmetic we omit from now on explicit
mention of the natural number structure when denoting the models of LT. That is, S |= φ is
short for (N,S) |= φ. Accordingly, S |=sk φ is short for (N,S) |=sk φ, that is, φ is true under
the strong Kleene scheme in the model (N,S).14 At first sight this alternative definition of
the sv-scheme might seem terribly opaque but it can be summarized in a simple way: a
sentence φ is true under the interpretation S in the supervaluation scheme iff φ follows in
the admissible precisification from the sentences that are true under the interpretation S in
the strong Kleene scheme (i.e. the sentences in G). More precisely, φ is true according to
the supervaluation scheme in a given interpretation S iff the sentences that are true in S
according to the strong Kleene scheme jointly imply φ in the class of classical (standard)
models MS = {S′ : S ⊆ S′& Φ(S′)}. It is worth noting that if a sentence is true according
to the strong Kleene scheme it will be true according to the supervaluation scheme simply
because it will always imply itself in MS. With this remark in mind it is now clear how
the compositional structure of a sentence and the logical structure the sentence is embedded
in play together in the supervaluation scheme: either a sentence is true according to its
compositional structure, that is, the strong Kleene scheme, or it is implied in MS by the
sentences that are true according to the strong Kleene scheme under the interpretation S.
It is this second condition, which guarantees that penumbral truths will always be true
under the supervaluation scheme independently of the truth values of its subsentences. This
tells us that this second condition, i.e. truth preservation in the model classMS, is a sufficient
condition for accounting for penumbral truths. But is it a necessary condition? To answer this
question recall that penumbral truths are sentences that are true simply because of the logical
relations that hold between the sentences of the language. Our analysis of the supervaluation
scheme then suggests that the relevant notion of logical relation is truth preservation inMS,
that is, truth preservation in a class of standard models with varying interpretations of the
truth predicate. But is this the right explication of logical relation or does the supervaluation
scheme take us beyond penumbral truths? This depends on how strict an understanding
of logical is employed. The consequence relation at play, that is truth preservation with
respect to the class MS, goes beyond the consequence relation of full second-order logic.
The consequence relation of full-second order logic fixes the standard model, whereas the
consequence relation used in the supervaluation scheme further restricts the class of relevant
model to the class MS, i.e., it only considers models that improve on the interpretation of
the truth predicate that is currently assumed. In other words, the second-order consequence
relation fixes the admissible model(s) for the language without the truth predicate whereas
the consequence relation employed in the supervaluation scheme goes one step further by
telling us what the admissible models for the language with the truth predicate are. It is
already questionable whether full second-order logic and thus second-order consequence
remains within the bounds of logic. In fact, many people agree that second-order logic
goes beyond the bounds of logic because of its ontological commitment and its expressive
strength—indeed it is often thought to be mathematical rather than logical in character. As
we have mentioned, the consequence relation at play in the supervaluation scheme goes
beyond second-order consequence. It uses all information available to relate sentences,
rather than just simple logical structure. In light of these remarks it seems reasonable to
search for an alternative condition accounting for penumbral truths, that is, a condition that
is based on a stricter understanding of the term logical. By this we do not mean to discredit
14See Halbach (2011) for a definition of the strong Kleene satisfaction relation.
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the supervaluation scheme as unreasonable or unmotivated. Indeed the claim is not that
the supervaluation scheme gets things wrong. Rather the claim is that we do not need to
appeal to this strong a consequence relation and, consequently, the supervaluation scheme to
account for penumbral truths. In other words it seems that truth preservation inMS is not a
necessary condition for accounting for penumbral truths. Of course, there may be good other
reasons to opt for a strong consequence relation and the supervaluation scheme. However, as
far as penumbral truths are concerned there is room for an alternative to the supervaluation
scheme, that is, a simpler and more transparent scheme, which remains somewhat closer to
the strong Kleene scheme.
On a stricter understanding of logical relation, the appropriate consequence relation seems
to be the one of first-order logic and, for most examples used to motivate the supervaluation
schemes, first-order consequence proves sufficient—indeed we are not aware of a motivating
example for which second-order consequence or the even strongerMS-consequence relation
is required. This suggests that if we are interested in penumbral truths only, accounting for
penumbral truths via first-order consequence is the way forward. First-order consequence is,
in many respects, much simpler than the alternative condition of the supervaluation scheme.
Whereas second-order and supervaluational consequence requires universal quantification
over sets of natural numbers, first-order consequence can be spelled out by appeal to exis-
tential quantification over natural numbers. In other words the latter relation is recursively
enumerable. Moreover, our alternative definition of the supervaluation scheme provides us
with a strategy for constructing an alternative evaluation scheme that is inspired by the su-
pervaluation scheme but uses the first-order consequence relation to account for penumbral
truth. The scheme will be called supervaluation-style truth scheme (sst) where |=1LT denotes the
first-order consequence relation in the language with the truth predicate:
S |=sst φ :⇔ ∃G
(
∀ψ ∈ G(S |=sk ψ) & G |=1LT φ
)
Like the supervaluation scheme the new scheme collects the sentences, which (i) are
true according to the strong Kleene scheme under the interpretation of the truth predicate S
and (ii) whatever follows from these sentences. However, in contrast to the supervaluation
scheme this second condition is no longer considered to be truth preservation in the classMS
but simple first-order consequence, that is, truth preservation in all models of the language.
Despite this difference between the supervaluation scheme and the supervaluation-style
truth scheme, we take it that the evaluation schemes are very close in spirit, both collect
some classical consequences of the sentences that are true according to the strong Kleene
scheme. They only disagree on exactly what these consequences are, or rather, how these
consequences are best collected.
It may be argued that moving to first-order consequence comes at a cost: we can no longer
rule out certain interpretations as being unprincipled, that is, we can no longer consider
admissible interpretations only. But this is only partly true. As long as the admissibility
condition can be expressed via a first-order formula we can simply add this condition to
the set of strong Kleene truths, i.e. the set G. For example, according to one particular
supervaluation evaluation scheme we shall be discussing later we should only consider
consistent interpretations of the truth predicate, that is, interpretations such that for no
sentence φ, φ and ¬φ are in the interpretation of the truth predicate. Now, if, for every
sentence φ, we add the sentence ¬(Tpφq ∧ Tp¬φq) to the set G this will have the effect that
we only consider consistent interpretations of the truth predicate since only models with
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a consistent interpretation of the truth predicate will be possible models of the set G. Of
course, the supervaluation-style truth scheme cannot emulate admissibility conditions that
cannot be expressed in first-order languages. But allowing for admissibility conditions that
cannot be expressed in first-order languages would undermine the very motivation of the
supervaluation-style truth scheme and thus this limitation seems to be well motivated and
unproblematic.
If we have chosen an interpretation of the truth predicate for which the Kripkean process
based on the sst-scheme terminates in a fixed point, then this means that either a sentence
is true because of the truth value of its subsentences or because it logically follows from the
sentences in the interpretation of the truth predicate. The scheme thus works compositionally
for all sentences except for some penumbral truths, namely those that are ungrounded in the
Kripkean sense according to the strong Kleene scheme. For these ungrounded penumbral
truths the scheme uses the underlying logical structure in form of the first-order consequence
relation. As we have mentioned first-order consequence, as opposed to second-order conse-
quence, is a rather simple and transparent condition and can be expressed within a first-order
language. This means that we can actually state what is happening when evaluating a sen-
tence with respect to its compositional structure has proven insufficient. At least from the
first-order perspective, nothing similar is possible for the supervaluation scheme: if the eval-
uation of a sentence via its compositional structure has failed, then the evaluation process
becomes opaque and mysterious. We simply do not know why a given sentence is true or
false.
As we have just seen, even if the evaluation of a sentence via its compositional structure
fails, the evaluation process of the supervaluation-style truth scheme remains, at least to a
certain extent, transparent. We take this to suggest that the failure of compositionality in
the supervaluation-style truth scheme is somewhat less drastic than in the supervaluation
scheme. The gap between the strong Kleene scheme qua compositional scheme and the
supervaluation-style truth scheme can be bridged via a simple first-order condition. This is
not possible for the supervaluation scheme. As a matter of fact, it is precisely for this reason
that Kripke’s theory of truth based on the supervaluation-style truth scheme will prove
more amenable to a proof-theoretic characterization than its supervaluational counterparts.
However, before we turn to proof-theoretic questions we investigate the new scheme in detail
and compare it to the strong Kleene scheme and, especially, the supervaluation scheme.
3. Evaluation Schemes, Kripke Jumps, and Fixed Points
In the introduction to this paper, we have already pointed out that Kripke’s theory of truth can
be formulated using various evaluation schemes and in this section we introduce the eval-
uation schemes that are crucial for our investigation: the relevant supervaluation schemes,
the strong Kleene scheme and the supervaluation-style truth schemes.
Each evaluation scheme e gives rise to a jump operation Je : P(ω)→ P(ω) with
Je(X) = {#φ : X |=e φ}
for X ⊆ ω. A jump operation Je is called a Kripke jump iff it is monotone, i.e. iff
X ⊆ Y⇒ Je(X) ⊆ Je(Y).
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The monotonicity of the Kripke jump guarantees that there will be fixed points, that is, there
will be sets S ⊆ ω such that
Je(S) = S.
Among these fixed points, one particular fixed point stands out, namely, the minimal fixed
point. The minimal fixed point can be obtained by iterative application of the jump operation
to the empty set. In other words there will be an ordinal number α such thatJαe (∅) = Jα+1e (∅),
where by Jαe (S) we denote that the jump operator has been applied α-times starting from
the set S.15 Kripke’s theory of truth can be understood as advocating either arbitrary fixed
points as suitable interpretation of the truth predicate or the minimal fixed point only.16 We
will come back to this distinction in Section 4.
Before we turn to the different evaluation schemes we introduce some notation and
terminology we shall be using. Throughout the paper we assume some reasonable coding
scheme for the expressions of LT. For terminology we mostly follow Halbach (2011). We
denote the Go¨del number of an expression ζ by #ζ and the numeral of #ζ will be denoted by
pζq. For a closed term t we write tN to denote its interpretation in the standard model. We let
the setsSentLT (“LT-sentences”) andCtermLT (“LT-closed terms”) represent themselves and
drop the subscript when no confusion can arise. Quantification of the form ∀s, tφ is short for
∀x, y(Cterm(x)∧Cterm(y)→ φ(x, y)). In most cases, if B is a syntactic operation we represent
it by B. . However, there are few exceptions to this rule: we represent the ternary substitution
function by x(s/t) where x(s/t) is a name of the expression that results from replacing t by s
in x. Also, we let ◦ represent the function that takes codes of closed terms as arguments and
provides their denotation as output. Finally, pφ( t. )q is short for pφ(x)q(t/pxq) where t is the
code of a closed term, i.e., pφ(x)q(t/pxq) is the name of a formula in which the free variable
has been replaced by some closed term.
3.1 Supervaluation
So far we only introduced a generic supervaluation scheme in which we left the admissibility
relation unspecified. From now on we consider two particular supervaluation schemes with
specific admissibility conditions:
X |=vb φ :⇔ ∀Y(X ⊆ Y & Y ∩ X− = ∅ ⇒ Y |= φ)
X |=vc φ :⇔ ∀Y(X ⊆ Y & Y ∈ CONS⇒ Y |= φ)
X− is the antiextension of the truth predicate, which is defined as the set of negations of the
sentences in X. CONS is the set of consistent sets of sentences.17 The schemes vb and vc are the
most prominent supervaluation schemes in connection to truth but there is a further popular
scheme, which we will mostly neglect. This scheme is based on a stronger admissibility
15The monotonicity of Je guarantees the existence of fixed points and the existence of a minimal fixed point:
there are more ordinal numbers than sentences of the language so at some point we run out of sentences that we
can add to the interpretation of the truth predicate—we have reached a fixed point. If we start from the empty
set the fixed point we obtain must, by monotonicity, be the minimal fixed point.
16There is a further fixed point which is of particular interest, namely, the maximal intrinsic fixed point. The
maximal intrinsic fixed point contains all sentences for which the negation of the sentence is in no fixed point
of the jump operation at stake. So the construction of the fixed point does not involve any arbitrary semantic
decisions.
17A set of sentences X is consistent if for no sentence φ: #φ ∈ X and #¬φ ∈ X.
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condition which stipulates that Y must be a maximally consistent set, i.e. Y ∈ MAXCONS.18
We omit discussion of this latter supervaluation scheme because it is not classically sound,
that is, it lacks the following important property:
Lemma 3.1 (Classical Soundness). Let X ∈ CONS. Then for all φ ∈ LT
(i) X |=vb φ⇒ X |= φ;
(ii) X |=vc φ⇒ X |= φ.
The supervaluation schemes give rise to the following supervaluation jump operations.
Let X ∈ CONS and set
VB(X) := {#φ : X |=vb φ};
VC(X) := {#φ : X |=vc φ}.
Notice that the jump operation is only defined for consistent sets. Inconsistent sets would
immediately lead to the trivialization of the jump operation.19 The scheme vc considers
fewer models than the scheme vb. As a consequence the jump operation VC collects more
sentences than the jump operation VB, that is, for S ∈ CONS, VB(S) ⊆ VC(S). Indeed, if S is
not only consistent but also a partial interpretation of the truth predicate, i.e. S∪S− , SentLT ,
then VB(S) ( VC(S) and, as a consequence, the two jump operations do not share any fixed
points.20 Such fixed points exist since it is easy to verify that both jump operations are
monotone and that VB and VC are thus Kripke jumps.
3.2 Strong Kleene
We provide two alternative jumps, which deliver the same fixed points. We refrain from
introducing the strong Kleene scheme in detail, since it is well known and may be found in
several textbooks.21 In this section we assume negation to be defined and correspondingly
take¬T to be a primitive expression of the language—the falsity predicate. Later in this paper,
once we turn to theories of truth, we refrain from this understanding of the negation symbol
and in later sections the following definitions have to be supplemented by the obvious duals
to the compositional clauses. The first jump operation is the strong Kleene jump SK
SK(X) := {#φ : X |=sk φ}
|=sk is the usual strong Kleene satisfaction relation defined in our restricted language.22
Again, it is well known and easy to verify that the strong Kleene jump is monotone and thus
a Kripke jump in our sense.
18MAXCONS is the set of maximally consistent sets of sentences. A set of sentences X is maximally consistent
if it is consistent and, in addition, it is maximal, that is for all sentences φ: #φ ∈ X or #¬φ ∈ X. The scheme was,
e.g., suggested by Kripke (1975).
19Trivialization is immediate in the case of the VC jump. In case of the VB there is actually no trivialization
but for no inconsistent set S we have S ⊆ VB(S) and thus all fixed points are reached starting from consistent sets.
20See Fischer et al. (2015) for a proof of this observation and further discussion of the different supervaluation
schemes.
21See, for instance, McGee (1991) or Halbach (2011).
22See, e.g., Halbach (2011).
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It is also well-established that the strong Kleene fixed points can be obtained via an
arithmetically definable operator. Let ξ(x,X) be the following formula:
x ∈ True0∨(1)
∃y, z (x = (y∧. z) ∧ (y ∈ X ∧ z ∈ X))∨(2)
∃y, z (x = (y∨. z) ∧ (y ∈ X ∨ z ∈ X))∨(3)
∃y (x = ∀. vy ∧ ∀t(y(t/v) ∈ X))∨(4)
∃y (x = ∃. vy ∧ ∃t(y(t/v) ∈ X))∨(5)
∃t(x = T. t ∧ t◦ ∈ X)∨(6)
∃t (x = ¬. T. t ∧ (¬. t◦ ∈ X ∨ t◦ < Sent))(7)
x ∈ True0 in line 1 denotes that x is a true arithmetical literal. In our case this means that x
is either the code of a true identity statement or the code of a true refutation of an identity
statement. The operator defined by ξ(x,X) is given by:
Ξ(S) := {n ∈ ω : N |= ξ(x,X)[n,S]}
By a folklore theorem we know that the two different jump operations have the same fixed
points:23
Theorem 3.2. For all S ⊆ ω
SK(S) = S⇔ Ξ(S) = S.
However, this theorem does not imply that the operators agree on all stages of the
inductive definition. Rather the strong Kleene scheme gathers “more” sentences than Ξ, i.e. ,
for all S ⊆ ω, Ξ(S) ⊆ SK(S).
The strong Kleene scheme is more restrictive than the supervaluational schemes, that is, it
excludes more sentences. In particular, as we have discussed in the introduction of this paper
not all logical truths of the language LT will be true under the the strong Kleene scheme. As
a consequence, for consistent, partial interpretations of the truth predicate, the output of the
strong Kleene jump is a proper subset of the outputs of the supervaluation jumps:
Lemma 3.3. Let S ∈ CONS and S ∪ S− , SentLT . Then
SK(S) ( VB(S) ( VC(S).
After presenting the well-know supervaluation schemes and the strong Kleene scheme we
finally move to a precise formulation of our novel evaluation scheme—supervaluation-style
truth.
3.3 Supervaluation-Style Truth
In Section 2 we introduced the main idea behind the supervaluation-style truth scheme. The
idea was that a sentence is true according to the supervaluation-style truth scheme if it is a
classical consequence of the sentences that are true according to the strong Kleene scheme:
S |=sst φ :⇔ ∃G
(
∀ψ ∈ G(S |=sk ψ) & G |=1LT φ
)
.
23See (Halbach, 2011, pp. 202-210) for a detailed exposition of this result.
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We will modify this definition in two minor respects. First, since the first-order consequence
relation is compact we can replace second-order quantification over sets of sentences by first-
order quantification over individual sentences. Second, we are working in an arithmetical
language and we want our notion of first-order consequence to include certain facts about
arithmetic and, by the same token, certain facts about syntax theory. The idea is to assume
some reasonable arithmetical theory in LT, say PAT (Peano Arithmetic in the extended
language), as an additional premiss. This would yield the following definiens of the sst-
scheme:
∃ψ
(
S |=sk ψ& PAT, ψ |=1LT φ
)
.
Due to the completeness theorem for first-order logic we know that we can equivalently
replace the first-order consequence relation by its syntactic counterpart and we shall do
so in the official version of the scheme. The official version will come under the label
supervaluational strong Kleene (ssk):
S |=ssk φ :⇔ ∃ψ
(
S |=sk ψ&PAT ` ψ→ φ
)
.
The scheme directly leads to a jump operation—the supervaluational strong Kleene jump
(SSK), which, as in the case of the supervaluational jump operations, is defined for consistent
sets of sentences only. For inconsistent sets of sentences trivialization would arise since the
output would always be the set of all sentences. Let S ∈ CONS and set
SSK(S) := {#φ : S |=ssk φ}.
Now, as in the strong Kleene case but in stark contrast to the supervaluation case we can,
using an arithmetical formula, define a second jump operator, which will have the same fixed
points as the SSK-operator. We obtain the relevant arithmetical formula θ by replacing the
strong Kleene satisfaction relation by the formula ξ we introduced in the previous section
and the derivability condition by its arithmetization. Accordingly, let θ(x,X) be the formula
∃y (ξ(y,X) ∧ PrPAT(y→. x)) .
As for the ssk-scheme, it might sometimes be helpful to recall that θ is equivalent to the
following disjunctive condition:
ξ(x,X) ∨ ∃y (ξ(y,X) ∧ PrPAT(y→. x)) .
The corresponding operator Θ is then defined as follows for S ∈ CONS:
Θ(S) := {n ∈ ω : N |= θ(x,X)[n,S]}.
As we shall see, the SSK operator, which can be readily verified to be a Kripke jump, is
closely related to the supervaluationalVB-operator. But we can also define a supervaluation-
style truth operator that relates to the alternative supervaluation scheme VC, which only
considers consistent interpretations of the truth predicate as admissible precisifications. For
the case of supervaluation-style truth this has the consequence that we need to add the
assumption that the truth predicate is consistent to our sets of premises, i.e., we have to make
sure that sentences of the form ¬(Tpφq ∧ Tp¬φq) are available premises when determining
the relevant first-order consequences. We writeCon(φ) to denote the fact that φ is of the form
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¬(Ts∧ T¬. t) where tN = sN. The scheme sskc (consistent supervaluational strong Kleene) is
then defined as follows:
S |=sskc φ⇔ ∃ψ((S |=sk ψ or Con(ψ)) &PAT ` ψ→ φ)
and, unsurprisingly, the corresponding operator is given by
SSKc(S) := {#φ : S |=sskc φ}
for S ∈ CONS.
Parallel to the case of the basic supervaluation-style truth scheme we can define a match-
ing operator Θc using an arithmetical formula. To this end let con(x) be the formula
∃s, t (x = p¬(T s. ∧ T¬. t. )q ∧ t◦ = s◦)
and let ξc(x,X) be the formula
ξ(x,X) ∨ con(x).
Finally, let θc be the following X-positive arithmetic formula:
∃y (ξc(y,X) ∧ PrPAT(y→. x)).
The resulting operator, Θc is defined as expected. Let S ∈ CONS and set
Θc(S) := {n ∈ ω : N |= θc(x,X)[n,S]}.
Similarly, we can provide a supervaluation-style truth scheme that can be associated with
the third prominent supervaluation scheme, which quantifies over maximally consistent sets.
For the corresponding supervaluation style truth scheme we need to add a further condition
to the definition of sskc, namely the completeness condition. This can be done by writing
Com(φ) ifφ is of the form Tt∨T¬. s where either tN = sN and by supplementing the definition
of sskc accordingly. We label the resulting scheme sskmc and the resulting operator SSKmc,
which alike the other two supervaluational strong Kleene jumps is a Kripke jump in our
sense. Similarly, Θmc is obtained from Θc by supplementing ξc and thus θc by an appropriate
clause com(x). However, like its supervaluational counterpart the scheme SSKmc is not
classically sound, that is, Lemma 3.7 (below) and its corollaries will fail for this scheme. This
will make reasoning about the fixed points of the corresponding operator more difficult and
for this reason, as our remarks in Section 3.1 suggest, we will ignore the scheme for the rest
of the paper.24
As we have mentioned the SSK- and the Θ-operators have the same fixed points and we
prove this fact in Theorem 3.5 below. But first we observe that the SSK-operators collects at
least as many sentences as the Θ-operators.
Lemma 3.4. Let S ∈ CONS. Then Θ(S) ⊆ SSK(S) and Θc(S) ⊆ SSKc(S).
Theorem 3.5. For all S ∈ CONS
(i) SSK(S) = S⇔ Θ(S) = S
(ii) SSKc(S) = S⇔ Θc(S) = S.
24It is perhaps worth mentioning that certain observations in this paper also hold for the mc scheme. For
example, the results of Section 4 will carry over to the minimal fixed point of this scheme.
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The proof is easy but quite painful. We give an outline of the crucial arguments.
Proof sketch. (i) For the left-to-right direction we assume SSK(S) = S and show for all φ,
#φ ∈ Θ(S)⇔ #φ ∈ S.
If #φ is in Θ(S) then there exists a sentence γ such that
ξ(pγq,S) &PAT ` γ→ φ.
where S denotes a predicate constant that has been added to the language of first-order
arithmetic that is interpreted by S.25 By an induction on the positive complexity of γ we can
convince ourselves that ξ(pγq,S) implies #γ ∈ SSK(S), which allows us to infer #φ ∈ SSK(S),
that is, by assumption, #φ ∈ S. For the converse direction we assume #φ ∈ S. This implies
#φ ∈ SSK(S) and there must be a sentence ψ such that S |=sk ψ and PAT ` ψ → φ. Now, we
assume #φ < Θ(S) and ¬ξ(pψq,S). By induction on the positive complexity of ψ using the
fact that S is a SSK-fixed point we can show that this assumption leads to a contradiction.
We conclude #φ ∈ Θ(S).
Similarly, for the right-to-left direction we assume Θ(S) = S and show for all φ,
#φ ∈ SSK(S)⇔ #φ ∈ S.
Now, if #φ ∈ S, then by assumption #φ ∈ Θ(S) and by Lemma 3.4 #φ ∈ SSK(S). For the
converse direction we assume #φ ∈ SSK(S). Then there must be a sentence γ such that
S |=sk γ&PAT ` γ→ φ.
By a secondary induction on the positive complexity of γwe can convince ourselves that
S |=sk γ implies #γ ∈ Θ(S). Thus there is a sentence γ′ such that ξ(pγ′q,S) and PAT ` γ′ → γ.
Hence, PAT ` γ′ → φ and we may infer #φ ∈ Θ(S), that is, by assumption, #φ ∈ S.
The proof of (ii) follows the pattern of (i). For the left-to-right direction we assume
SSKc(S) = S and show for all φ that
#φ ∈ Θc(S)⇔ #φ ∈ S.
The argument is like for (i) with the exception that γ might be of the form ¬(Ts ∧ T¬. t)
where tN = sN. In this case the left-to-right direction the claim also follows directly from the
definition of Θc and the fact that con(pγq). The converse direction is as for (i) modulo the
necessary modifications.
For the right-to-left direction assume Θc(S) = S and show for all φ that
#φ ∈ SSKc(S)⇔ #φ ∈ S.
Modulo the necessary modifications the reasoning we used for (i) can also be applied to
(ii). 
25We implicitly assume the following equivalence:
N |= ξ(x,X)[#γ,S]⇔ S |= ξ(pγq,S).
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In light of Theorem 3.5 we use, from now on, the jump operation that appeals most
for the respective task when proving results about supervaluation-style truth fixed points.
However, we repeat our warning that the fact that Θ and SSK have the same fixed points
does not imply that the two operations agree on all the stages of the inductive definition.
This is generally not the case.
We collect a number of properties relating the different jump operations. Most noteworthy
is the fact that supervaluation-style truth jump operations combine aspects of the strong
Kleene jump and the supervaluational jump and are situated in between the two jumps:
Lemma 3.6. Let S ∈ CONS and S ∪ S− , SentLT . Then
(i) SSK(S) ( SSKc(S);
(ii) SK(S) ( SSK(S) ⊆ VB(S);
(iii) SK(S) ( SSKc(S) ⊆ VC(S).
Proof. We only prove item (i) and (ii) for sake of illustration. For (i) the inclusion is a straight-
forward consequence of the definition of SSK(S) and SSKc(S). To see that the inclusion is
strict we notice that by assumption for each S there must be a sentence φ such that #φ < S
and #¬φ < S. But then #¬(Tpφq ∧ Tp¬φq) < SSK(S), yet by the definition of SSKc we have
#¬(Tpφq ∧ Tp¬φq) ∈ SSKc(S).
(ii) The first inclusion is trivial since PAT ` φ → φ for all φ ∈ LT. For the second inclusion
we reason as follows using Lemma 3.3 and the fact that PAT is true in all models of LT over
the standard model:
#φ ∈ SSK(S)⇔ ∃ψ(S |=sk ψ&PAT ` ψ→ φ)
⇒ ∃ψ(S |=vb ψ&PAT ` ψ→ φ)
⇒ ∃ψ
(
∀S′(S ⊆ S′& S− ∩ S′ ⇒ S′ |= ψ) &PAT ` ψ→ φ
)
⇒ ∃ψ∀S′(S ⊆ S′& S− ∩ S′ = ∅ ⇒ S′ |= ψ ∧ ψ→ φ)
⇒ ∀S′(S ⊆ S′& S− ∩ S′ = ∅ ⇒ S′ |= φ)
⇒ #φ ∈ VB(S). 
In Lemma 3.6 the inclusion between the strong Kleene scheme and the supervaluation-
style schemes is strict whereas this is not the case for the subset relation between the
supervaluation-style schemes and the supervaluation schemes. Moreover, in general, the
latter relation cannot be turned into a strict subset relation because, as we shall see in the next
section, theSSK (SSKc) operator and theVB (VC) operator have the same minimal fixed point.
Before we prove this claim we continue collecting some facts about the supervaluation-style
truth operators.
Lemma 3.7. Let S ∈ CONS. Then for all φ ∈ SentLT
(i) #φ ∈ SSK(S)⇒ S |= φ
(ii) #φ ∈ SSKc(S)⇒ S |= φ.
Proof. (i) By definition of SSK(S) we know that for all #φ ∈ SSK(S) there exists a ψ such
that S |=sk ψ&PAT ` ψ → φ. But this together with S ∈ CONS and the fact that all models
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based on the natural number structure are PAT-models implies S |= ψ& S |= ψ → φ, which
yields S |= φ. For (ii) we can apply essentially the same reasoning since for S ∈ CONS and
all φ ∈ LPAT, Con(φ) implies S |= φ. 
Corollary 3.8. Let S ∈ CONS. Then SSK(S) ∈ CONS and SSKc(S) ∈ CONS.
Corollary 3.9 (Classical Soundness). Let S ⊆ SSK(S) or S ⊆ SSKc(S). Then for all φ ∈ LT
(i) #φ ∈ S⇒ S |= φ
(ii) S |= Tpφq→ φ.
Corollary 3.9 implies that supervaluation-style fixed points are models of themselves. A
final observation that comes in useful throughout the paper is that the supervaluation style
fixed points are closed under modus ponens.
Lemma 3.10. Let SSK(S) = S. If #φ ∈ S and #(φ→ ψ) ∈ S, then #ψ ∈ S.
Proof. Assume #φ ∈ S and #(φ → ψ) ∈ S. Then by assumption there exist γ, γ′ such that
S |=sk γ&PAT ` γ → φ and S |=sk γ′&PAT ` γ′ → (φ → ψ). This implies PAT ` γ ∧ γ′ → ψ
and by definition of the sk-scheme we also obtain S |=sk γ ∧ γ′. By definition we have
#ψ ∈ SSK(S). 
So far we have discussed the different evaluation schemes and their associated jump from
a very general perspective. The next section will be devoted to comparing the minimal fixed
points of the supervaluation- and the supervaluation-style jumps.
4. Grounded Supervaluation-Style Truth
We have already hinted at two different ways Kripke’s theory of truth can be understood.
According to the first we take the theory to advocate the minimal fixed point of the relevant
jump operation to be the intended interpretation of the truth predicate. According to the
second way of understanding the theory all fixed points qualify as suitable interpretations
of the truth predicate. In this section we focus on the first understanding of Kripke’s theory
and compare Kripke’s theory in its supervaluational version to the version based on the
supervaluation-style truth scheme. It turns out that if we are only interested in the minimal
fixed point of the jump operations, supervaluational truth and supervaluation-style truth
coincide: the supervaluation jumps have the same minimal fixed-point as their respective
supervaluation-style truth jumps.
Before we start establishing these results, let us quickly note that the main reason that the
first understanding of Kripke’s theory of truth is very interesting from a philosophical point
of view is that it gives rise to the notion of grounded truth: the sentences in the minimal fixed
point of the various jump operations do not depend on particular assumptions regarding
the notion of truth and no sentences are declared true at the outset of the construction
process. In other words the sentences in the minimal fixed point only depend on, i.e. are
grounded in, non-semantic states of affairs.26 The fact that the supervaluational jumps and
the supervaluation-style truth jumps have the same fixed points therefore means that the
26For further discussion of the notion of groundedness we refer the reader to Kripke (1975), Herzberger (1970),
Yablo (1982) and Leitgeb (2005).
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different schemes give rise to the same notion of grounded truth. This is a nice outcome
from the perspective of supervaluation-style truth since the ssk-scheme is clearly simpler
and more transparent than the supervaluational scheme. As a consequence the construction
process leading to the minimal fixed point will be more transparent, which squares better
with the notion of grounded truth since this notion seems to require a traceable path from
a grounded sentence to the basic fact grounding it. The notoriously opaque nature of the
supervaluation scheme makes it much more difficult to provide such a path. Moreover, the
very nature of the supervaluation scheme of looking at all admissible possible interpretations
of the truth predicate does not fit well with the idea of groundedness in the first place. From
this perspective the supervaluation-style truth jump operations may be seen as providing a
more transparent and less complex characterization of grounded (minimal) supervaluational
truth.
In alignment with our previous discussion, the ultimate goal of this section will be to
establish that the aforementioned jumps have the same minimal fixed point.
Theorem 4.1. For a given evaluation scheme e let Ie denote the minimal fixed point of the jump
operation associated with the scheme e. Then
(i) Ivb = Issk
(ii) Ivc = Isskc .
Using the subset relation the theorem may be split up in two directions. The right-to-
left direction, that is, the fact that the minimal supervaluation-style truth fixed points are
contained in the minimal supervaluation fixed point is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.6:
Lemma 4.2.
(i) Issk ⊆ Ivb
(ii) Isskc ⊆ Ivc.
The converse direction, however, requires some more work. The result is proven by
appeal to Cantini’s infinitary Tait-style calculus (Cantini, 1990), which we label SVc∞. Cantini
shows that
SVc∞ ` φ⇔ #φ ∈ Ivc.
Moreover, it is clear from his construction that we can do the same for the supervaluation
scheme vb.27 Let us call the calculus that has been modified to this effect SV∞ (see Definition
4.5 below).
Lemma 4.3 (Cantini). For all φ ∈ LT,
(i) SV∞ ` φ⇔ #φ ∈ Ivb
(ii) SVc∞ ` φ⇔ #φ ∈ Ivc.
27Notice that the only purpose of the initial sequent (AX.C) of SVc∞ (cf. Definition 4.5) is to account for the fact
that in the scheme vc we only consider consistent precisifications of a given interpretation of the truth predicate.
As a consequence all sentences of the form ¬Tpφq∨¬Tp¬φq are true in each such admissible precisification and
are thus members of every VC-fixed point. (AX.C) guarantees that we can derive all sentences of this form and
their consequences. Sentences of this form are, however, not always true in all admissible vb-precisifications and
thus not always members of the VB-fixed points. For this reason we need to drop the initial sequent (AX.C) from
the infinitary Tait-style calculus in this case. However, once we have dropped (AX.C) we can copy Cantini’s
reasoning and establish Lemma 4.3.
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In virtue of Cantini’s theorem it suffices to prove the following lemma for showing that the
minimal supervaluation fixed points are contained in the respective minimal supervaluation-
style truth fixed points.
Lemma 4.4. For all φ ∈ LT,
(i) SV∞ ` φ⇒ #φ ∈ IΘ
(ii) SVc∞ ` φ⇒ #φ ∈ IΘc .
Before we start our proof of Lemma 4.4 we introduce the rules and axioms of the infinitary
calculus. As in Section 3.2, the negation symbol is not officially part of our language but
defined in the usual way. ¬T should hence be understood as a primitive falsity predicate
and the sentences of the language are supposed to be in their negation normal form.
Definition 4.5 (The calculus SV∞). We use Γ for finite sets of sentences of the languages and
A,B,A1,A2, . . . for the sentences of the language. The calculus has three basic axioms:
(AX.1) ` Γ,A; if A is a true arithmetic literal;
(AX.2) ` Γ,¬Tt,Ts; if tN = sN;
(Sent) ` Γ,¬Tt; if tN < Sent.
The calculusSVc∞ has, in addition to three basic axioms, one further axiom that reflects the consistency
condition that is required for the supervaluation scheme vc:
(AX.C) ` Γ,¬Ts,¬T¬. t; if tN = sN;
In addition to the axioms SV∞ and SVc∞have the following rules:
(∧) ` Γ,A ∧ B,A ` Γ,A ∧ B,B` Γ,A ∧ B (∨)
` Γ,A1 ∨ A2,Ai
` Γ,A1 ∨ A2 , i ∈ {1, 2}
(ω) for all n ∈ ω ` Γ,∀xA,A(n)` Γ,∀xA (∃)
for some n ∈ ω ` Γ,∃A,A(n)
` Γ,∃xA
(T) ` A` Γ,Tt , t
N = #A (¬T) ` ¬A` Γ,¬Tt , t
N = #A
We need one more auxiliary lemma for proving Lemma 4.4.
Lemma 4.6. Let Γ be a set of formulas. Then
(i) SV∞ ` Γ⇒ #
(∨
Γ
)
∈ IΘ
(ii) SVc∞ ` Γ⇒ #
(∨
Γ
)
∈ IΘc .28
Proof. In the proof we shall focus on item (i). The proof is by an induction on the height of
the derivation in SV∞. As induction hypothesis we may assume that for all α < β
SV∞ `α Γ⇒ #
(∨
Γ
)
∈ IΘ
28By SV∞ ` Γ (SVc∞ ` Γ) we denote that ` Γ is a derivable sequent in SV∞ (SVc∞).
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where SV∞ `α Γ denotes that Γ has been derived in SV∞ by a proof of height α. AX.1
follows from (1) of the definition of ξ , reflexivity of PAT-implication and classical logic, i.e.,
disjunction introduction. AX.2 may be obtained from (1) of the definition of ξ and, again,
classical logic.
For the induction step we need to show that membership in IΘ is closed under the rules
of SV∞. We deal with (∨) and (ω) for sake of illustration. The remaining cases work in a
similar way. For (∨) we may assume SV∞ `β Γ, φ ∨ ψ and SV∞ `α Γ, φ ∨ ψ, χ for χ ∈ {φ,ψ}.
By IH we obtain #
∨
(Γ, φ ∨ ψ, χ) ∈ IΘ. But PAT ` ∨(Γ, φ ∨ ψ, χ) → ∨(Γ, φ ∨ ψ) and thus
#
∨
(Γ, φ ∨ ψ, χ)→ ∨(Γ, φ ∨ ψ) ∈ IΘ. By Lemma 3.10 we obtain # ∨(Γ, φ ∨ ψ) ∈ IΘ.
Let us now turn to (ω). We assume SV∞ `β Γ,∀xφ and SV∞ `α Γ,∀xφ,φ(n) for all
n ∈ ω. By IH we infer # ∨(Γ,∀xφ,φ(n)) ∈ IΘ for all n ∈ ω. By (4) of the definition of ξ we
obtain #∀y ∨(Γ,∀xφ,φ(y)) ∈ IΘ where we choose y to be new to Γ and ∀xφ. Then PAT `
∀y ∨(Γ,∀xφ,φ(y))→ ∨(Γ,∀xφ) and, again, by Lemma 3.10 we conclude ∨(Γ,∀xφ) ∈ IΘ.
Now, for item (ii) we have to deal, in addition to the basic axioms we discussed for (i),
with Ax.C. This, however, can be done rather easily by appeal to the consistency condition
in θc: by assumption s = t and ¬(Ts ∧ T¬. t) is, by definition, ¬Ts ∨ ¬T¬. t. 
Since Lemma 4.6 has Lemma 4.4 as an immediate consequence, we can establish our main
Theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Immediate consequence of Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.4. 
In virtue of Theorem 4.1 we know that supervaluation-style truth and the supervaluation
schemes have the same minimal fixed points.29 As a consequence, the different schemes give
rise to the same notion of grounded truth.
Furthermore, as an immediate corollary of this fact we know the complexity of the
minimal fixed point of the supervaluation-style truth jump operations.
Corollary 4.7. Issk and Isskc are Π
1
1-complete sets of integers.
Proof. By results of Kripke (1975) and Burgess (1986) we know that the minimal fixed point
of VB and VC is Π11-complete. The claim is thus immediate by Theorem 4.1. 
Now that we have seen that the supervaluation-style truth and the supervaluation scheme
agree on the minimal fixed point, the immediate question arises whether the jump operations
of the two types of schemes agree on all fixed points: does Kripke’s supervaluation theory
of truth also coincide with Kripke’s theory based on the supervaluation-style truth scheme
on the second understanding of his theory where we are interested in arbitrary fixed points?
If the answer was yes, then this would show, as far as the notion of truth is concerned, that
there is no difference between the supervaluation scheme and the supervaluation-style truth
scheme. Moreover, the move from second-order to first-order consequence would not have
any consequences when constructing suitable interpretations of the truth predicate.
This would be rather surprising, and indeed, the two schemes cannot agree on all fixed
points. More specifically, there must be at least one supervaluation-style truth fixed point
29One might wonder how the minimal strong Kleene fixed point relates to the minimal supervaluation-style
truth fixed point. The former is, obviously, a subset of the latter. Moreover, the minimal supervaluation-style
fixed point is not just the minimal strong Kleene fixed-point closed under PAT. The sentence Tpλ ∨ ¬λq, where
λ is a usual Liar sentence, is a member of the former but it is not a member of the minimal strong Kleene fixed
point closed under PAT.
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that is not a supervaluation fixed point: by results of Welch (2015) (see also Fischer et al.
(2015)) we know that every supervaluation fixed point is Π11-hard. But as a consequence
of Theorem 5.1 below we know that there must be a supervaluation-style truth fixed point
that is not Π11-hard. Thanks to Philip Welch (personal communication) we can say a little bit
more about the relation between supervaluation-style truth fixed points and supervaluation
fixed points: there must be a maximal VB-fixed point that is not a SSK-fixed point. This
follows from two observations: 1. Due to complexity considerationsVB andSSK cannot have
the same maximal intrinsic fixed point. The maximal intrinsic VB-fixed point is ∆12-in-a-Π
1
2
parameter while the maximal intrinsic SKK-fixed point is at most Σ11-in-a-Π
1
1 parameter.
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2. The maximal intrinsic fixed point is the intersection of all maximal fixed points of the
respective scheme.31 Now, by Lemma 3.6, if a maximal VB-fixed point is a SSK-fixed point,
then it is a maximal SSK-fixed point. Hence, there must be a maximal VB-fixed point, which
is not a SSK-fixed point for otherwise, by 2, the two schemes would have the same maximal
intrinsic fixed point, which contradicts 1.32 Moreover, all these remarks are independent of
the particular choice of the supervaluation and the supervaluation-style truth scheme. In
particular, everything would go through for the schemes vc and sskc. Welch’s observation
has two immediate consequences. On the one hand, it shows that the set of supervaluational
fixed points is not a subset of the set of supervaluation-style truth fixed points. Indeed putting
this together with our previous observation the set of supervaluation fixed points and the
set of suervaluation-style fixed points are incomparable with respect to the subset relation.
On the other hand, Welch’s observation shows that the evaluation schemes also diverge
with respect to the the maximal intrinsic fixed point. The latter observation is interesting
since the maximal intrinsic fixed point is the largest fixed point that can be obtained without
making arbitrary decisions with respect to the truth value of certain sentences. As a possible
interpretation of the truth predicate the maximal intrinsic fixed point is thus of particular
interest and the fact that the schemes differ on the maximal intrinsic fixed point shows that
despite similarities, the two schemes give rise to different versions of Kripke’s theories of
truth, at least, if we are not interested in grounded truth. In the next section, further to
our last remark, we observe that no jump operation, which is definable by a first-order
arithmetical formula, can have exactly the same fixed points as any of the supervaluational
jumps we have discussed. This observation will kick off the discussion of axiomatic theories
of supervaluation-style truth.
5. Axiomatic Theories of Supervaluation-Style Truth
The inductive definition of IΘ can be used to extract an axiomatic theory of truth—as in
the case of strong Kleene scheme and the axiomatic theory KF (“Kripke-Feferman”).33 The
resulting axiomatic theory of truth will not uniquely determine IΘ as the suitable interpreta-
tion of the truth predicate even if the interpretation of the arithmetical vocabulary is fixed
at the outset. So, the theory will not be a theory of grounded supervaluation-style truth. In
30See Burgess (1988) for a proof of the former. The latter observation follows from the definition of the
maximal intrinsic fixed point and the fact that the complexity of set of sentences true in some SSK fixed point is
at most Σ11, which follows immediately from the definition of the SSK scheme.
31See, for instance, (Visser, 1984, Theorem 2.18.2).
32Welch’s observation is actually slightly stronger. It shows that there is a maximal VB-fixed point S such that
S * SSK(S).
33See Halbach (2011) for a presentation and discussion of KF.
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fact, Fischer et al. (2015) observe that, in general, there cannot be a recursively enumerable
theory that uniquely characterizes a non-reducible Π11-set of natural numbers relative to the
standard model so not such axiomatic theory could be given. However, it is possible that the
axiomatic theory, which is extracted from the clauses of the inductive definition, characterizes
the lattice of fixed points generated by the SSK-jump relative to the standard model, that is,
the interpretations of the truth predicate in the standard model must be fixed points of the
SSK-jump. Such a theory is, in the terminology of Fischer et al. (2015), N-categorical. This
suggests that axiomatic theories of truth are an interesting tool for investigating Kripke’s
theory of truth on its arbitrary fixed-point reading.
The straightforward way to extract anN-categorical theory from the operator Θ is to add
to the axioms of PA formulated in the language LT, that is PAT, the axiom
(θAx) ∀x (Tx↔ θ(x,T)) .34
We shall call this theory BIT.
Theorem 5.1. Let S ⊆ ω. Then
S |= BIT⇔ Θ(S) = S.
Proof. ⇒: Assume S |= BIT and assume for an arbitrary sentence φ ∈ LT that #φ ∈ S:
#φ ∈ S⇔ S |= Tpφq
⇔ S |= θ(pφq,T) (θAx)
⇔N |= θ(x,X)[#φ,S] Def.
⇔ #φ ∈ Θ(S) Def. Θ
This establishes the left-to-right direction.
⇐: Assume S = Θ(S) and suppose for arbitrary n ∈ ω that S |= Tn. Then n ∈ S and thus
by assumption n ∈ Θ(S). But the latter is equivalent to N |= θ(x,X)[n,S] which by definition
is equivalent to S |= θ(n,T). This yields the desired result. 
Theorem 5.1 has the immediate consequence that supervaluation-style truth and super-
valuational truth cannot agree on all fixed points. Indeed, as we have pointed out at the
end of Section 4, Theorem 5.1 shows that there must be a supervaluation-style fixed point
that is not a supervaluation fixed point since it implies that not all supervaluation-style fixed
points can be Π11-hard. The theorem establishes that the second-order property of being
a supervaluation-style truth fixed point defines a ∆11-set of sets of natural numbers. But
no ∆11-set of sets of natural numbers can have only Π
1
1-hard sets of natural numbers as its
members. Rather such a second-order property would be a non-reducible Π11-set of sets
of natural numbers, which, unsurprisingly, is exactly the complexity of the supervaluation
fixed-point property.35 It is worth noting that in the proof of Theorem 5.1 we did not assume
any particular property of θ and as a consequence we may infer that no jump operation that
34Here, and in the remainder of the paper θ(x,T) (θc(x,T)) and ξ(x,T) (ξc(x,T)) denote the formulas where all
occurrences of the free second-order variable X have been replaced by the truth predicate.
35See Fischer et al. (2015) for further discussion and explanation.
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is definable by a first-order arithmetical formula can have exactly the same fixed points as
the supervaluational jump.
In the case of purely compositional jumps such as the jump Ξ in the strong Kleene
case, using the strategy that led to the theory BIT not only produces N-categorical but also
attractive theories. In this case the theory obtained by adding
(ξAx) ∀x (Tx↔ ξ(x,T))
to PAT has a neat alternative axiomatization. We can divide (ξAx) into a list of biconditionals
that provide the truth conditions of a sentence of LT depending on the build-up of the
sentence. For example, for disjunctions we can provide the following axiom:
∀x, y (Sent(x∨. y)→ (Tx∨. y↔ Tx ∨ Ty)) .
The resulting theory is just the well-known theory KF.
5.1 The Theories of Inductive Truth
However, in the case of the supervaluation-style jumps we do not necessarily obtain nice
theories in this way since we cannot break down (θAx) into a number of “interesting”
biconditionals depending on the built-up or the compositional structure of a sentence. The
reason for this limitation is, of course, that the supervaluation-style jump operation is closed
under PAT-consequence and thus the jump is not compositional. Fortunately, the failure
of compositionality is not as drastic as in the case of the supervaluational jumps. Rather,
in the case of the supervaluation-style jumps by the means of a first-order formula we
can point precisely where, and to which, extent compositionality—and thus compositional
reasoning—fails. As a consequence, it turns out that, after all, we can provide a list of axioms
that depending on the built up provides us with conditions for the truth of a sentence. In
other words, we can provide an attractive theory of supervaluation-style truth, which is anN-
categorical axiomatization of the fixed points of the supervaluation-style jump operation. But
we shall not be using the formula θ directly in constructing our theory and as a consequence
establishing the N-categoricity result will require some metatheoretic reasoning which goes
beyond simply reading off the clauses of the inductive definition. A further point worth
noting is that in this section, in contrast to the previous sections, we take ¬ to be a primitive
logical constant of the language.
Definition 5.2 (Inductive Truth). Inductive Truth (IT) consists of all axioms of PA in the language
LT and the following axioms:
(Ax1) ∀s, t(Ts =. t↔ s◦ = t◦)
(Ax2) ∀s, t(Ts,. t↔ s◦ , t◦)
(Ax3) ∀x, y
(
Sent(x∧. y)→ (Tx ∧ Ty→ T(x∧. y)))
(Ax4) ∀x, y
(
Sent(x∨. y)→(
Tx ∨ Ty ∨ ∃z (ξ(z,T) ∧ PrPAT(z→. x∨. y))↔ T(x∨. y)))
(Ax5) ∀v∀x
(
Sent(∀. vx)→
(∀tTx(t/v)→ T ∀. vx))
(Ax6) ∀v∀x
(
Sent(∃. vx)→ (∃tTx(t/v) ∨ ∃z (ξ(z,T) ∧ PrPAT(z→. ∃. vx))↔ T ∃. vx)
)
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(Ax7) ∀t(Tt◦ → T T. t)
(Ax8) ∀t(T¬. t◦ ∨ ¬Sent(t◦)↔ T¬. T. t)
(Ax9) ∀x, y(Tx ∧ PrPAT(x→. y))→ Ty)
(Ax10) ∀x(T¬. x→ ¬Tx)
(Ax11) Tp∀x(Tx→ Sent(x))q
(Ax12) ∀t1, . . . , tn
(
Tpφ( t1. , . . . , tn. )q→ φ(t◦1, . . . , t◦n)
)
.
The reader acquainted with Cantini’s (Cantini, 1990) theory VF will remark some striking
similarities between VF and IT. We compare the two theories later in this paper, once we
have investigated IT in some detail.
Lemma 5.3. Let Pos denote the set of formulas in which the truth predicate occurs only in the scope
of an even number of negation symbols. Then IT proves
(i) ∀x, y
(
Sent(x→. y)→ (Tx ∧ Tx→. y→ Ty)
)
(ii) ∀x, s, t
(
Sent(∀. vx)→ (s◦ = t◦ → (Tx(s/v)↔ Tx(t/v)))
)
(iii) ∀x, y
(
Sent(x∧. y)→ (Tx ∧ Ty↔ T(x∧. y)))
(iv) ∀v∀x
(
Sent(∀. vx)→
(∀tTx(t/v)↔ T ∀. vx))
(v) ∀t (T T. t↔ Tt◦)
(vi) ∀x (Tx→ Sent(x))
(vii) ∀t1, . . . , tn
(
Tpφ( t1. , . . . , tn. )q↔ φ(t◦1, . . . , t◦n)
)
, for φ ∈ Pos
(viii) ∀x (ξ(x,T)→ Tx)
(ix) ∀x, y (ξ(x,T) ∧ PrPAT(x→. y)→ Ty).
Proof. (i) is proved by (Ax3) and (Ax9). For (ii) observe that by (Ax1) and (Ax9) we obtain
T(s =. t→. (x(s/v) ↔ x(t/v))). The claim follows by (i) and (Ax1). (iii) by (Ax9) and (Ax3);
(iv) by (Ax5), (Ax9) and (ii); (v) by (Ax7) and (Ax12); (vi) is proved by (Ax11) and (Ax12).
The left-to-right direction of (vii) is by (Ax12), the converse direction is by an induction on
the build-up of the sentences in Pos. (viii) is also proved by an induction on the positive
complexity of φ; (ix) is immediate by (viii) and (Ax9). 
Lemma 5.3(vii) has the interesting consequence that we can interpret KF in IT.
Corollary 5.4 (Cantini/Halbach). KF is truth definable in IT.36
Proof. See Halbach (2009, pp. 792/793). 
36The notion of truth definability was introduced by Fujimoto (2010). Roughly, it means that there is an
unrelativized interpretation of KF in IT which keeps the arithmetical vocabulary fixed.
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As in Cantini’s theory VF (Cantini, 1990) we cannot turn IT into a compositional theory,
that is, we cannot replace (Ax4) and (Ax6) by the following equivalences:
(Ax4+) ∀x, y
(
Sent(x∨. y)→ (Tx∨. y↔ Tx ∨ Ty))
(Ax6+) ∀v∀x
(
Sent(∃. vx)→ (∃tTx(t/v)↔ T ∃. vx)
)
Each of the axioms so strengthened will cause the theory to become inconsistent. Actually,
we can show that they cause inconsistency even if we dispense of (Ax12). To see this notice
that each of the strengthened axioms implies Tpλq ∨ Tp¬λq in IT (without (Ax12)). For
(Ax4+) consider the instance Tpλ ∨ ¬λq↔ Tpλq∨Tp¬λq. For (Ax6+) letψ(x) be the formula
(x = 0 ∧ λ) ∨ (x = 1 ∧ ¬λ) and consider the corresponding instance of the converse direction
of (Ax6): Tp∃xψ(x)q→ ∃tTpψ( t. )qwhere PAT ` ∃xψ(x). But also by (Ax9) ∃tTpψ( t. )q implies
Tpλq ∨ Tp¬λq.37 Here λ is a sentence such that
(L) PAT ` λ↔ ¬Tpλq.
We have
1. Tpλq→ Tp¬Tpλqq (L), (Ax9),Lemma 5.3 (i);
2. Tpλq→ ¬TpTpλqq 1,(Ax10);
3. Tpλq→ TpTpλqq (Ax7);
4. Tpλq→ ⊥ 2,3;
5. Tp¬λq→ Tp¬Tpλqq (Ax8)
6. Tp¬λq→ ¬TpTpλqq 5,(Ax10);
7. Tp¬λq→ TpTpλqq (L), Lemma 5.3 (i);
8. Tp¬λq→ ⊥ 6,7.
9. Tpλq ∨ Tp¬λq→ ⊥ 4,8
Before we discuss the models of IT, we introduce the theory of Consistent Inductive Truth,
which is intended to match the supervaluation-style jump operations SSKc and Θc.
Definition 5.5 (Consistent Inductive Truth). Consistent Inductive Truth (ITc) consists of axioms
(Ax1)-(Ax3), (Ax5) and (Ax7)-(Ax12) of IT together with
(AxC) ∀t (TpT¬. t. → ¬T t. q) ;
(Ax4c) ∀x, y
(
Sent(x∨. y)→(
Tx ∨ Ty ∨ ∃z (ξc(z,T) ∧ PrPAT(z→. x∨. y))↔ T(x∨. y)));
(Ax6c) ∀v∀x
(
Sent(∃. vx)→ (∃tTx(t/v) ∨ ∃z (ξc(z,T) ∧ PrPAT(z→. ∃. vx))↔ T ∃. vx)
)
.
In Definition 5.5, the axiom (Ax10) and the left-to-right direction of (Ax8) are redundant,
that is, they could be proved on the basis of the remaining axioms of ITc.
37See Friedman and Sheard (1987, p. 15) for the argument leading to the inconsistency of (Ax6).
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5.2 Inductive Truth and Supervaluation-style Fixed Points
As promised, we now turn to models of IT (ITc) and show that IT (ITc) characterizes the
supervaluation-style truth fixed points relative to the standard model, that is, we show that
IT (ITc) is an N-categorical axiomatization of the supervaluation-style fixed points. As a
by-product we establish the consistency of IT (ITc). Indeed, this follows directly from the
next lemma which establishes that the axioms of IT (ITc) are true in the classical fixed-point
models of SSK (SSKc).
Lemma 5.6. Let S ⊆ ω.
(i) SSK(S) = S⇒ S |= IT
(ii) SSKc(S) = S⇒ S |= ITc.
Proof. (i) Ax1-7, Ax11 follow immediately from the definition of the jump Θ and the reflexivity
of PAT-implication. Ax10 follows from the definition of the jump and Corollary 3.8. Ax12
follows directly from Corollary 3.9. The left-to-right direction of Ax8 follows again from the
definition of the jump. For the converse direction we may assume that #¬Tt◦ ∈ SSK(S). Then
there must be a ψ such that S |=sk ψ and PAT ` ψ → ¬Tt◦. Now, PAT ` ψ → ¬Tt◦ implies
∀X ⊆ ω(X |= ψ⇒ X 6|= Tt◦). But this is guaranteed only, if t◦ is not the name of a sentence or
if there exists a φ such that t◦ = pφq and X |= ψ implies #¬φ ∈ X. Since for S ∈ Cons, S |=sk ψ
implies S |= ψ, we may conclude to the desired.
(ii) We only discuss (AxC), as the remaining axioms are, modulo the necessary modifica-
tions, as in the proof for (i). We assume SSKc(S) = S and need to show that for an arbitrary
closed term t, #T¬. t→ ¬Tt ∈ S. By assumption S is closed under PAT and it suffices to show
#¬(T¬. t ∧ Tt) ∈ S. But since Con(¬(T¬. t ∧ Tt)) we know that #¬(T¬. t ∧ Tt) ∈ SSKc(S) and
thus #¬(T¬. t ∧ Tt) ∈ S by assumption. 
Corollary 5.7. IT and ITc are consistent.
Next we show that the converse direction of Lemma 5.6 holds as well. This establishes
that IT (ITc) is an N-categorical axiomatization of the SSK (SSKc) fixed points.
Theorem 5.8 (N-categoricity). Let S ⊆ ω. Then
(i) S |= IT⇔ SSK(S) = S
(ii) S |= ITc ⇔ SSKc(S) = S.
Proof. The right-to-left direction is by Lemma 5.6. For the converse direction one shows by
a routine induction on the positive complexity of φ that
(i) #φ ∈ S⇔ #φ ∈ Θ(S)
(ii) #φ ∈ S⇔ #φ ∈ Θc(S).
For both items we discuss the case φ  ψ ∨ χ and leave the remaining cases to the reader:
(i) Before we start note that S |= Tpψq∨ Tpχq implies S |= ∃z(ξ(z,T)∧PrPAT(z→. pψ ∨ χq)):
#(ψ ∨ χ) ∈ S⇔ S |= Tpψ ∨ χq
⇔ S |= Tpψq ∨ Tpχq ∨ ∃z(ξ(z,T) ∧ PrPAT(z→. pψ ∨ χq)) (Ax4)
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⇔ S |= θ(pψ ∨ χq,T) Def.
⇔N |= θ(x,X)[#(ψ ∨ χ),S])
⇔ #(ψ ∨ χ) ∈ Θ(S). Def.
(ii) The proof of (ii) is exactly parallel to the one of (i). It suffices to replace ξ, θ and Θ by,
respectively, ξc, θc and Θc. 
Theorem 5.8 establishes that IT and ITc are N-categorical axiomatizations of Kripke’s
theory of truth based on the schemes SSK and SSKc respectively, which substantiates our
claim that supervaluation-style truth admits a neat proof-theoretic characterization.
5.3 Inductive Truth and Cantini’s theory VF
For the proof of Theorem 5.8 to work it was crucial that we could provide a precise condition
of when compositionality was allowed to fail. Moreover, it is important that this condition
can be expressed by a first-order arithmetical formula (with one free second-order variable)
for otherwise we could not express this condition appropriately within the truth theory.
This is exactly the reason why we cannot provide an N-categorical axiomatization of the
Kripke’s theory of truth based on a supervaluational scheme: for supervaluation schemes
there will not be a first-order arithmetical condition that tells us when compositionality fails.
As a consequence, the tie between the Cantini’s theory VF and the scheme VC, which VF is
thought to capture, cannot be as close as the relation between ITc and SSKc.
Despite these differences the theories of inductive truth and Cantini’s theory VF are very
similar theories. In fact, VF is a proper subtheory of ITc and differs from this theory only in
the axioms (Ax4c) and (Ax6c), which are replaced by the following principles:
(∨Ax) ∀x, y
(
Sent(x∨. y)→ (Tx ∨ Ty→ T(x∨. y)));
(∃Ax) ∀v∀x
(
Sent(∃. vx)→ (∃tTx(t/v)→ T ∃. vx)
)
.
However, like ITc the theory VF includes the axiom (AxC), which makes it incomparable to
IT via the subtheory relation.
The crucial difference between the theories of Inductive Truth and VF consists thus
(unsurprisingly) in the compositional axioms for ∨ and ∃. For all three theories full com-
positionality fails, but while VF remains silent with respect to the reason for this failure, the
theories of inductive truth provide, as we have repeatedly urged, exact conditions under
which compositional reasoning fails.
To see that VF is a proper subtheory of ITc the N-categoricity of the latter theory proves
useful: it provides us with an argument that ITc is not LT-conservative over VF. In other
words, ITc is a proper extension of VF. By a result of Cantini (1996) we know that a set of
stable sentences over the Herzberger sequence is a VF-model. But it cannot be an ITc-model,
as this would contradict Theorem 5.8, that is, the N-categoricity of ITc with respect to SSKc
fixed points.38
As we shall see in the next section the situation changes when we ask whether ITc is
L-conservative, i.e. conservative in the arithmetical language, over VF. This leads to the
38No set S of stable sentences can be a Θ-fixed point since for each such S there will be Liar sentences λ1 and
λ2 such that #(λ1 ↔ λ2) ∈ S but #(λ1 ↔ λ2) cannot be a member of any Θ-fixed point. See Burgess (1986) for
further details.
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question of the proof-theoretic strength of the theories of inductive truth. Due to the fact that
ITc is a proper supertheory of VF we cannot rely on Cantini’s (Cantini, 1990) results when
determining the proof theoretic strength of the theories of inductive truth but have to check
to what extent these results carry over.
6. Proof Theory
The theories IT and ITc are to date the strongest N-categorical theories on the market. This
follows from a result by Friedman and Sheard (1987) who show that a subtheory of IT is
proof-theoretically equivalent to ID1.
Theorem 6.1 (Friedman & Sheard). Let Σ be a theory extending PAT which proves (T-Out), (Ax1),
(Ax2), (Ax9) and
∀x, v
(
Sent(∀. vx)→
(∀yTx(y/v)→ T ∀. vx)).
Then Σ proves all arithmetical theorems of ID1.
This establishes the lower bound of the proof-theoretic strength of IT and ITc. The upper
bound is not that immediate. A starting point is to look atVF for which Cantini (1990) showed
ID1 to be the upper proof theoretic bound and to see whether Cantini’s proof strategy works
for ITc likewise. Cantini’s strategy was to interpret VF in KPU formulated over number
theory.
Theorem 6.2 (Cantini). VF can be interpreted in KPU formulated over number theory.
But by a result of Ja¨ger (Ja¨ger, 1982) we know that KPU formulated over number theory
is proof-theoretically equivalent to ID1, which provides the intended result.
Theorem 6.3 (Ja¨ger). KPU formulated over number theory and ID1 have the same arithmetical
theorems.
Corollary 6.4 (Cantini). VF and ID1 are proof-theoretically equivalent.
Clearly if we can show that ITc is interpretable in KPU we could use the same reasoning
to conclude that ITc is proof-theoretically equivalent to ID1. However, since VF is a proper
subtheory of ITc the interpretability of VF in KPU does not guarantee that ITc is interpretable
in KPU. In this section we show how this fact can be established.
We will show that ITc is interpretable in KPU by, once more, hijacking Cantini’s proof.
As we have mentioned, Cantini (1990) showed that VF can be interpreted in KPU. For his
result Cantini uses the fact that in KPU we can define the layers (stages) of an inductive
definition and, as a consequence, we can define a predicate Der(α, ρ, pΓq), which formalizes
SVc∞ `αρ Γ, i.e., Γ is derivable SV∞ with height α and truth rank ρ.39 Cantini proposed to
translate a formula Tt by Der(t), which stands for ∃α∃ρDer(α, ρ, t), while the arithmetical
vocabulary is held fixed in the translation. He showed that under this translation VF can
be interpreted in KPU. But since the interpretation holds with the arithmetical vocabulary
fixed this establishes the upper bound of VF by the aforementioned result of Ja¨ger (1982).
39The truth rank keeps track of the number of applications of the truth rules (T) and (¬T).
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For this proof to work it is important that we can prove the formalized versions of certain
properties of SVc∞ in KPU and these properties will also be important for showing that ITc
can be interpreted in KPU.
We start the proof of this latter claim by observing that in KPU we can define a predicate
constant Iα
Θc
, which formalizes the stages of the inductive definition of the minimal fixed
point of Θc. Now, by translating a formula Tt by t ∈ IΘc , i.e. ∃α(t ∈ IαΘc),—while again keeping
the arithmetical vocabulary fixed—we can show that the translations of the axioms (Ax1-7),
(Ax.9) and (Ax11) are provable in KPU. Now the remaining axioms of ITc cannot be checked
in a straightforward way under the chosen interpretation of the truth predicate because they
cannot simply be read off from the clauses of the inductive definition. Fortunately these
remaining axioms are axioms of VF and thus provable under the translation of the truth
predicate as the formula Der. Moreover, by Lemma 4.1 we know that derivability in SVc∞
coincides with membership in IΘc and this fact can be proven in KPU:
Lemma 6.5. For all φ ∈ LT
KPU ` Der(pφq)↔ pφq ∈ IΘc .
Proof sketch. The left-to-right direction of Lemma 6.5 is by a straightforward formalization of
Lemma 4.6. For the converse direction we cannot rely on our previous proofs since it is not
clear that they can be formalized in KPU. Fortunately it turns out that the converse direction
of Lemma 4.1 can be proved in alternative way, that is, by an induction on the stages of the
inductive definition and this proof can be formalized in KPU: as an induction hypothesis we
assume that for all α < β
KPU ` pφq ∈ IαΘc → Der(pφq)
and prove by a routine (secondary) induction on the complexity of φ that
KPU ` pφq ∈ Iβ
Θc
→ Der(pφq).

As a consequence of Lemma 6.5 and Cantini’s interpretation of VF in KPU we know that
the translations of the remaining axioms of ITc are provable in KPU. Consequently, ITc can
be interpreted in KPU, which establishes the intended upper bound of the proof-theoretic
strength of ITc.
Lemma 6.6. Let φ ∈ LT and ∗ a translation function that commutes with all logical connectives and
quantifiers such that (s = t)∗ = (s = t) and (Tt)∗ = t ∈ IΘc . Then, if ITc ` φ, then KPU ` φ∗.
As we have just mentioned, this establishes the upper proof theoretic bound of ITc but by
inspecting the proof it is immediate that we can run a parallel argument to show the theory IT
can also be interpreted in KPU. This together with Friedman and Sheard’s result, determines
the proof-theoretic strength of IT and ITc.
Corollary 6.7. IT and ITc have the same arithmetical consequences as ID1.
By Corollary 6.7 we arrive at the following picture:
VF ≡ IT ≡ ITc ≡ ID1 ≡ Π11-CA−0 ≡ KPU.
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The theories of inductive truth are thus not only neat proof-theoretic characterizations of
Kripke’s theory of truth based on supervaluation-style truth schemes but they are also,
in general, the strongest N-categorical theories of Kripke’s theory of truth that have been
proposed so far. With this observation we end our technical investigation of supervaluation-
style truth and turn to a quick summary and evaluation of our findings.
7. Conclusion
We think that our work shows that the supervaluation-style truth scheme is an interesting
evaluation scheme that leads to an attractive version of Kripke’s theory of truth. Penumbral
truths will be in the interpretation of the truth predicate under the supervaluation-style truth
scheme but the scheme is much simpler and transparent than the supervaluation scheme.
This shows in the fact that the evaluation condition, which guarantees that penumbral truths
will always be true, can be expressed by a first-order formula. This is most decisively
not possible in the supervaluation scheme. Due to its simplicity the supervaluation-style
truth scheme remains somewhat closer to the strong Kleene scheme and also retains, at
least in parts, the constructive touch of the latter. This should make the supervaluation-
style truth scheme particularly interesting for the advocate of supervaluational truth who
is interested in grounded truth. It is also this simplicity that enables a neat proof-theoretic
characterization of Kripke’s theory based on supervaluation-style truth in the form of the
theories of inductive truth. We have shown these theories to beN-categorical axiomatization
of the supervaluation-style fixed points, while no N-categorical axiomatization of the fixed
points of the supervaluation scheme is possible. The theories of inductive truth are from a
proof-theoretic perspective fairly strong. Indeed they are the strongestN-categorical theories
available to date and considerably stronger than the theory KF, which is an N-categorical
axiomatization of the strong Kleene fixed points. Moreover, in the theories of inductive
truth, in contrast to KF, logical truths are true in the object-linguistic sense—they are in
all supervaluation-style fixed points. However, in KF the truth predicate commutes with
disjunction and the existential quantifier, which it does not in the theories of inductive truth.
This is of course where the failure of compositionality of the supervaluation-style truth
scheme shows. But it is also where we can see that the failure proves to be less drastic
than in the supervaluation scheme: in the theories of inductive truth we can state the exact
conditions under which a disjunction or an existential statement is true. Nothing of the like is
possible in the case of theories like VF, which are inspired by the the supervaluation scheme.
We take this to show that the supervaluation-style truth scheme really combines the best of
both “worlds” the strong Kleene and the supervaluation world.
One might argue that in contrast to the supervaluation scheme or the strong Kleene
scheme, the supervaluation-style truth scheme does not come with a semantic story motivat-
ing it. Rather it is ad hoc in flavor, so the argument would go, since it is exclusively motivated
by the desire of adding penumbral truths to the strong Kleene truth sets. While there is
certainly some truth in this, it seems worth pointing out that the supervaluation-style truth
jumps can be neatly motivated by the story Kripke uses to motivate his theory of truth in the
first place. Kripke described the construction process leading up to suitable interpretations
of the truth predicate as of a process of an interlocutor acquiring greater and greater under-
standing of the language with the truth predicate starting from the same language without
the truth predicate. At each stage of this process, so the story goes, the interlocutor comes
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to understand more and more truth ascriptions of the language. But in such a picture it
seems only reasonable to suppose that the interlocutor pauses at each stage to reflect which
further truth ascriptions she might infer using her deductive capacities. If we assume the
interlocutor to reason in classical first-order logic, then we have a direct motivation for our
supervaluation-style truth scheme.
This motivational story might also raise interest in alternative disjunctive schemes, that
is, schemes that consist of the standard strong Kleene satisfaction relation combined with
a suitable closure condition. In such schemes a sentence is true iff it is true according
to the strong Kleene scheme or it follows from some strong Kleene truth. In the case of
supervaluation-style truth the closure condition was taken to be first-order consequence but
in principle one could use alternative, possibly non-classical consequence relations to this
effect as long as the resulting jump operation will be monotone.40 This should be of interest
to philosophers and logicians who find the motivational story, or, more generally, the strong
Kleene construction, appealing but do not agree with the idealizing assumption that takes
the interlocutor to reason in classical logic. Moreover, if the consequence relation at stake is
first-order arithmetically definable we can apply the strategy sketched at the beginning of
Section 5 and obtain an axiomatic theory matching the resulting version of Kripke’s theory
of truth.41
While supervaluation-style truth might not have a neat story that provides independent
motivation for the scheme as such, it seems that it is well-motivated within the framework of
Kripke’s theory of truth. Moreover, the motivation that supports supervaluation-style truth
points to a wealth of possible disjunctive evaluation schemes that have not been sufficiently
explored. Therefore, we hope that our investigation into supervaluation-style truth will
serve a twofold purpose. Firstly, we hope to have established supervaluation-style truth as
an interesting alternative to the more complicated supervaluation schemes. In particular,
the scheme should be appealing to theorists who are interested in penumbral truths and
the idea of groundedness but who dislike the complex and intransparent character of the
supervaluation scheme.42 Secondly, we hope to have provided a starting point for further
exploration of the unknown territory of disjunctive evaluation schemes.
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